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Abstract
Objective: The objective is to describe the process used by the Office of River Protection
(ORP) for evaluating and implementing Contractor-initiated changes to the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant (WTP) Authorization Basis (AB).
Relationship to the Workshop: The WTP Project's history has provided a unique challenge for
establishing and maintaining an ORP-approved AB during design and construction. Until
operations begin, the project cannot implement the classic Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ)
process to determine when ORP approval of Contractor-initiated changes is required. A "quasi-
USQ" process has been implemented that defines when AB changes could occur. The three
types ofAB changes are (1) Limited Scope Changes, (2) Authorization Basis Deviations, and
(3) Authorization Basis Amendment Request (ABAR).
Description ofthe Work: DOE RL/REG 97-13, Office ofRiver Protection Position on
Contractor-Initiated Changes to the Authorization Basis, describes the process the WTP
Contractor must follow to make changes to the AB, with and without ORP approval.
The process uses a "safety evaluation" process that is similar to the USQ process but at a more
qualitative level.
Results of the Work: The maturation of the WTP Contractor's facility design and activities,
and other changing conditions, resulted in a process that allows the Contractor to make changes
to the AB without ORP approval; however, those changes that may significantly affect nuclear
safety do require ORP approval. This process balances the WTP regulatory principle of
efficiency with assurance that adequate safety will not be compromised.
Benefits ofthe Work: The process has reduced the number ofABARs requiring ORP approval
and reduced the potential for delays in design and procurement activities.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the salient features of the Office of River Protection
(ORP) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Authorization Basis (AB) maintenance
oversight function.
The initial concept for treatment and disposal of the high-level wastes at the Hanford Site was to
use private industry to design, construct, and operate a WTP to process the waste from aging
underground waste storage tanks. The WTP design was initiated in 1996 to build and operate
facilities to treat the waste according to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) specifications.
DOE developed a set ofprocess, nuclear and radiological standards for the design of the WTP.
DOE patterned its safety regulation of the WTP Contractor to be consistent with the concepts
and principles of good regulation (stability, clarity, openness, efficiency, and independence) used
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These standards (including rules, DOE Orders, and
standards) were consolidated into a single document called the Safety Requirements Document
(SRD). This process meets the expectations of DOE's necessary and sufficient closure process
(subsequently renamed Work Smart Standards process) in DOE Policy 450.3, Authorizing Use of
the Necessary and Sufficient Process for Standards-Based Environment, Safety and Health
Management, and is intended to be a DOE-approved process under DOE Acquisition
Regulations (DEAR) 970.5204-2, Laws, Regulations and DOE Directives, Section (c).
The current WTP Project is a design-and-construct-in-parallel activity. The typical project
would identify a design, get approval, and then construct. However, due to the long time for
construction, DOE is allowing the Contractor to design the facility within the confines of
process, radiological, and nuclear safety standards identified and approved prior to the design
activity in the SRD. This process for nuclear safety allows waste treatment services to occur on
a timely, predictable, and stable basis, with attention to safety.
The WTP Project is comprised of five unique facilities: (1) Pretreatment (PT) Facility, (2) Low-
Activity Waste (LAW) Facility, (3) High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility, (4) Balance of Facilities
(BOF), and (5) Analytical Laboratory.
• PT - Contain processes for pretreatment ofwaste transferred from the Hanford Site
underground storage tanks before it is immobilized at the LAW and HLW Vitrification
Facilities. Percent Complete: Design - 69% and Construction - 23%.
• LAW - Consists of two locally shielded melters and associated piping and vessels in
adjacent process cells. The LAW melter systems are designed to immobilize pretreated
waste and entrained solids that meet the LAW Vitrification Facility waste acceptance
requirements when blended with the appropriate glass formers. Percent Complete:
Design - 91 % and Construction - 58%.
• HLW - The main HLW process facility is a 500,000 square foot, five-story structure
that includes several belowgrade areas at different elevations. The HLW melter
systems are designed to immobilize pretreated waste and entrained solids that meet the
waste acceptance requirements when blended with the appropriate glass formers. The
quantity of glass produced will depend on the composition of the high-level waste.
Each melter has a design capacity ofup to 3 metric tons of glass per day. Percent
Complete: Design - 82% and Construction - 18%.
• BOF - Consists of facilities and systems (not directly involved with processing or
vitrification of radiological material) that are necessary for radiological waste
processing by the other WTP facilities. For example, the BOF provides services and
utilities such as electrical power, compressed air, and chilled water. Percent Complete:
Design - 68% and Construction - 61 %.
• Laboratory - Consists of facilities and systems that support process control, waste form
qualification testing, limited technology testing, management of outsourced sample
analysis, and receipt/analysis of samples. Percent Complete: Design - 77% and
Construction - 46%.
ORP has established an Authorization Agreement with the WTP Contractor, Bechtel National,
Inc. (BNI), authorizing full construction activities. This Authorization Agreement is the
Construction Authorization Agreement (CAA) between ORP and BNI. The CAA defines the
WTP AB as the composite of information provided by the WTP Contractor in response to
radiological, nuclear, and process safety requirements (i.e., SRD). The implementation of these
requirements forms the basis upon which the DOE grants permission to perform activities.
The following provides specific documents (including material incorporated by reference) that
form the basis for DOE's decision to authorize full construction activities:
a. Safety Requirements Document (SRD), Volume II
b. Integrated Safety Management Plan (ISMP)
c. Quality Assurance Manual (QAM)
d. Radiation Protection Program for Design and Construction
e. WTP Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER); the CSER documents the results of
criticality safety analysis by which limits and controls associated with criticality safety are
selected and confirmed by the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) process
f. Current Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and any associated safety evaluation
reports (SER) written against the biennial update
The PSAR is currently in the form of several volumes. One volume contains the "generic"
material that is pertinent to the entire WTP complex (e.g., site description, safety management
programs, etc.). Then there are specific volumes for each of the WTP facilities identified above.
These volumes contain the hazard/accident analysis, systems, structures, and components (SSe),
and derivation of technical safety requirements (TSR). The facility-specific volumes are updated
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biennially using a document called the Safety Envelope Document (SED). The SED is a "non-
AB" document that is maintained current by the Contractor to within approximately 60 days of
ORP approval of AB changes. The AB is not just relevant to specific ORP decisions but
also serves several functions following the completion of a specific regulatory action. The AB
describes the safety basis for the facility and is the benchmark used to evaluate the safety
implications of changes made to a Contractor's facility design, operations, or administrative
controls. The SRD portion ofthe AB identifies the standards which the Contractor uses to
design, construct, and operate the facility, and against which the ORP assesses Contractor
performance during each stage of the regulatory process. The importance of the AB to these
ongoing activities and the need to maintain a credible safety basis for the facility requires that the
AB be maintained. For changes to the SRD, the SRD must be maintained current so that both
the Contractor and the ORP clearly understand the design criteria at any point in time. For
potentially significant facility changes in the AB, as identified above, ORP approval of the
change before its implementation is essential to ensure adequate nuclear safety is maintained.
The AB for other facility changes and administrative controls changes is not updated as these
changes are made, but periodically (at least biennially). The Contractor must keep records of all
changes for periodic ORP oversight.
The maturation of the Contractor's facility design and activities, and other changing conditions,
result in a need to establish a process for the Contractor to make changes to the AB that may
significantly affect nuclear safety. This process needs to balance the WTP regulatory principle
of efficiency with assurance that adequate safety will not be compromised.
There are three main types of Contractor-initiated changes to the AB:
• Limited Scope Changes - Changes(s) to the facility and to administrative controls
without changing the AB
• Decisions to Deviate Changes - Change(s) to the facility that deviate from the facility
description in the AB
• Authorization Basis Amendment Requests (ABAR) - Changes that require ORP
approval prior to implementation
The purpose and process for each of these changes are discussed in the following sections.
Limited Scope Changes
Limited scope changes are those that do not involve major reorganizations of the Integrated
Safety Management Plan (ISMP) or PSAR, or that broadly affect these documents. Limited
scope changes are not potentially significant design changes. These types of changes can be
made without prior ORP approval as long as the Contractor performs a safety evaluation.
The safety evaluation must determine that the change complies with all applicable laws and
regulations, conforms to the SRD, and provides adequate safety. Basically, the limited scope
change might affect the level of detail in the AB but does not involve a significant facility design
change. A significant facility design change is a change that meets one of the following:
1. Creates a new design basis event (DBE).
2. Results in more than a minimal increase in the frequency or consequence of an analyzed
DBE as described in the safety analysis report.
3. Results in more than a minimal decrease in the safety functions of important-to-safety
SSC.
4. Changes how an SSC meets its respective safety function - Changes how a safety class
(SC) SSC meets its respective safety function, or for radiological protection of co-located
workers or facility workers, changes how a safety significant (SS) SSC meets its
respective safety functions.
Note: The criterion allows the Contractor to modify how a SS SSC meets its respective safety
function for hazardous chemicals without prior ORP approval.
The Contractors safety evaluation is provided as Figure 1. The safety evaluation process is very
similar to the unreviewed safety question (USQ) process used for operating facilities.
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Fil!:ure 1 - Example Part 1 Safety Evaluation
Part 1 Safety Evaluation
Description of change:
Discussion of hazards and/or event sequence:
Discussion of frequency. consequences, severity levels:
Discussion of control strategies:
YES NO
1. Does the change affect the safety envelope (SRD and applicable facility SED[s]), or is it a "broad 0 0
.....~~.?p.~~~ ..~~~.~~.? ... .......... ............•
Basis:
2. Does the change create a new DBE? 0 0
......... . ......................
Basis:
3. Does the change result in more than a minimal (2: 10 %) increase in the frequency or 0 0
. ......
coIlSequence.ofanaIlSlyzedI>llJ3as~es~ribedintlleSJ3D? .
Basis:
4. Does the change result in more than a minimal decrease in the safety functions of important-to- O 0
safety SSCs or change how a Safety Design Class or Safety Class SSC meets its respective safety
function, or, for radiological protection ofco-located workers or facility workers. change how a
.............
.~at:etySi~~cll11t~Sc;Ill:~~tsit~at:ety.fuI1~~o.n? ..
Basis:
5. Does the change result in a noncompliance with applicable laws and regulations 0 0
(i.e., 10 CFR 820, 830, and 835) or nonconformance with top-level safety standards
(i.e., DOE/RL-96-0006)?
.. ........... .....
Basis:
6. l?~es~ec.l1a.'.'~efail~0!'r.~.':i.~ea.<!:~9uat~s!lfety? 0 0
.............
Basis:
If all the answers to the questions are "no," to questions 1-5 and "yes" to question 6, then the
Contractor may make the changes without prior ORP approval. If there is a "yes" answer to
questions 2 through 5, the change is considered "significant" and ORP approval of an ABAR is
required (which is discussed later in this paper). Monthly, the Contractor submits a summary of
all safety evaluations that do not require ORP prior approval. ORP reviews the safety
evaluations to ensure agreement that a change does not involve a significant change. In addition,
ORP has established an adequacy review checklist to ensure the Contractor has provided
sufficient information and justification to allow an independent qualified reviewer to reach the
same conclusion. Figure 2 provides the ORP Safety Evaluation Adequacy Review.
Facility case-by-case noncompliances with SRD implementing codes and standards with narrow
application may be made as a limited scope change provided a safety evaluation is transmitted to
ORP within 30 days of identification of the noncompliance or determination of the need for the
noncompliance. The safety evaluation must conclude that the deviation complies with all
applicable laws and regulations, conforms to the SRD safety criteria, and provides adequate
safety. A limited scope change involving SRD noncompliance would (1) involve work not yet
initiated that would impact cost or schedule if not done on a timely basis, or (2) work already
completed if re-work would impact cost or schedule. If OPR determines that the justification for
the noncompliance is insufficient, the Contractor must correct the noncompliance within 60 days
ofwritten notification.
The Contractor may not make revisions to the SRD safety criteria without prior ORP approval.
The Contractor may not make changes to the SRD Implementing codes and standards without
prior ORP approval, except decisions to deviate (DTD) discussed later in this paper.
For limited scope changes, the Contractor will update the AB (PSAR or the ISMP) at least every
two years, commencing in September 2003, if changes have been made in the prior two years
that affect the PSAR or the ISMP. This update will be submitted to ORP for approval.
Fi ure 2 - ORP Monthl Safe Evaluation Ade uac Review Checklist
The questions below should be asked to ensure that changes evaluated by Part 1 Safety Evaluations (SE) do not inadvertently
significantly change the authorization basis and hence require an ABAR/ORP approval. After reviewing the Part 1 SE there are two
outcomes, (1) the Part 1 SE is acceptable and the change can be implemented at the next scheduled update to the PSAR, or (2) there
are questions that need to be clarified prior to a determination. If the review determines an acceptable Part 1 SE, document the fact
that a review was performed by signing the form and returning to the Safety Basis Team Lead for filing. If there are "unacceptable"
results, provide a justification as to why it is unacceptable. Discuss with BNI to resolve the questionslissues. Maintain the original
justifications and add clarifying statements provided by discussions with BNI to make it acceptable. If after the discussion with BNI,
the ORP SB engineer believes the proposed change should be addressed by an ABAR, involve the SB Team Lead to reach agreement
with BNI on path forward. Document the path forward in the recommendation section, sign form and submit to Safety Basis Team
Lead for Concurrence and filing.
Adequacy Review Justification if Unacceptable
Technical Acceptable Unacceptable
1. Does the Part 1 SE provide the reason for the change or
addition in sufficient detail to understand the basis for the 0 0
change? (Is the change required?)
2. Do the answers to the safety evaluation questions include a 0 0discussion of why... hazards are not affected?
3. ...potential accident/event sequences (i.e., frequency) are not 0 0affected?
4. ...accidental consequences are not affected? (public, co- O 0located worker, and the worker)
5. ...control strategies and alternatives are not affected? 0 0
6. Is the change adequately justified as not involving a broad 0 0scope perspective?
7. Are changes to other AB/safety envelope documents 0 0requiring modification identified, as applicable?
8. Could a knowledgeable reviewer identify the technical issues 0 0considered and the basis for the determination of safety?
9. IfISM meeting minutes are referenced, do the minutes 0 0specifically describe the change? Are they detailed enough?
10. Are there other technical issues? Describe. 0 0
RecommendationlPath Forward:
Rcvic\\crs Na~ D~
Responsible ORP/WTP SB Engineer
Safety Basis Team Lead
Decision to Deviate
Prior to the start of cold testing, for change(s) to the facility that deviate from the facility
description in the AB that must be made under the provisions of an ABAR or for changes to
SRD implementing codes and standards that potentially affect cost or schedule, the Contractor
may make these changes without prior ORP approval provided that:
a. The Contractor has performed an evaluation and determined the following:
1. Conformance with applicable laws and regulations, top-level standards and
principles, and SRD safety criteria is maintained.
2. Specific change(s) to be authorized do not cause or threaten imminent danger to the
workers, the public, or the environment from radiological, nuclear, or chemical
hazards.
b. The specific change(s) that will deviate from the AB have been identified.
c. The Contractor's process for implementing the change(s) is consistent with the
documentation and administrative controls described in DTD.
d. Delay of implementation of the change(s) could affect cost or schedule.
During the WTP construction phase, the Contractor notifies ORP of each Contractor-approved
deviation from the AB:
1. Either verbally or in writing within 24 hours.
2. In writing including a copy of the Contractor's approval within 3 working days.
As soon as practical but not later than 60 days following the decision to deviate from the AB, an
ABAR that will resolve the deviation from the AB is approved by the Contractor and submitted
to ORP. ORP approval of amendment requests submitted resulting from decisions to deviate
shall be obtained within 120 days ofthe Contractor's approval ofthese change(s).
If time limits specified are not met, extensions to the 60-/120-day time limits may be requested
and be approved by ORP when adequate justification for the delay is provided. If time limits
specified are not met and extensions are not requested and/or not approved by DOE, then:
1. All physical work associated with implementing the authorized change(s) (as
documented in the decision to deviate documentation) shall stop.
2. Corrective action shall be immediately taken to promptly correct the deviations.
All revisions to the AB associated with AB deviations shall be completed and resolved prior to
the start of cold-testing.
Authorization Basis Amendment Requests (ABAR)
If the proposed change(s) does not meet the conditions of approval for limited scope changes or
are in response to a decision to deviate, ORP approval is required. An AB revision that requires
the approval of ORP prior to implementation may be executed following ORP approval of the
request to amend the AB. An amendment request, submitted to ORP by means of an ABAR,
shall include the following:
a. Description of the proposed revision.
b. Reason for the proposed revision.
c. Description of the proposed implementation schedule for the revision and associated
change(s).
d. Copy of the AB document or appropriate excerpt showing the proposed revision.
e. Safety evaluation of the proposed revision as described in limited scope changes as
applicable for the type of change(s).
f. If the revision involves the deletion or modification of a standard previously identified in
the approved SRD, certification that the revised SRD will identify a set of standards that
will continue to provide adequate safety, comply with all applicable laws and regulations,
and conform to top-level safety standards.
The SRD will be updated within 30 days of Contractor receipt of ORP approval of the ABAR.
For facility changes, the Contractor will update the AB (PSAR) every two years, commencing in
September 2003, if changes have been made in the prior two years. This update will be
submitted to ORP for approval.
Upon receipt of the ABAR from the Contractor, ORP performs an adequacy review to ensure
there is sufficient information to allow a qualified review. ORP has developed an "Adequacy for
Review Checklist" to document that an ABAR meets ORP expectations (see Figure 3).
)0
Fi
Technical
I. Does the ABAR provide the reason for the change or addition
in sufficient detail to understand the basis for the ABAR? (i.e.,
what is the current wording in the SED, what is proposed and
SRD requirement being met by the proposed
change/addition?)
2. Are all SE questions answered for each change and the bases
provided?
3. Does the description of the change/addition or answers to the
safety evaluation questions include a discussion on hazards?
4. ...on potential accident/event sequences?
5. ...on accidental consequences? (public, co-located worker,
and the worker)
6. ...on control strategies and alternatives considered and
justified?
7. Is the hazard evaluation (items 3-6, above) documented in
sufficient detail in the changed AB/safety enveloped pages
such that an independent reviewer comes to the same
conclusions?
8. Is the change broad scope perspective? If so, have all
affected facilities been included in the ABAR? If not why not?
9. If the change is to an SSC not currently described in the AB,
should it be? (i.e., should Chapter 2 of the Authorization Basis
be modified?)
10. Are other AB/safety envelope documents affected?
II. Could a knowledgeable reviewer identify the technical issues
considered and the basis for the determination ofsafety?
12. Does the ABAR conflict with pending/unapproved AB
changes?
13. IfISM meeting minutes are referenced, do the minutes
specifically describe the change? Are they detailed enough?
14. Should a meeting be held with DOE, prior to ABAR
submittal, to discuss technical issues?
15. Are there other technical issues? Describe.
Administrative
I. Are ABAR page changes numbered, complete?
2. Have correct revisions ofall documents been used?
3. Are all the applicable implementing documents and activities
listed and provided on a CD?
for Review Checklist
Adequacy Review Justification ifUnacceptable
Acceptable Unacceptable
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
D D
Adequacy Review Justification ifUnacceptable
Acceptable Unacceptable
D D
D D
D D
)1
After the adequacy review, ORP detennines if a team review involving unique discipline support
is required or that the safety basis engineer is sufficient to perfonn the review. In either case, the
review is perfonned and documented in a safety evaluation report (SER) approved by the ORP
Manager. The SER documents a summary of changes with respect to overall safety adequacy.
In addition, the explicit individual page/section changes are evaluated on their own merit as well.
Based on the results of the review, there are three possible approval mechanisms:
1. Approved as submitted.
2. Approved with directed changes where specific wording modifications are required by
ORP.
3. Approved with Condition(s) of Acceptance (COA), where most of the document is
considered approved but additional analysis or supporting documentation is required by
ORP for specific review to close an issue.
When the Contractor submits an ABAR, the pages being modified are not the actual pages of the
PSAR. In fact, the Contractor uses the language of"Page changes to the PSAR as represented
by the SED." As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the SED encompasses the hazard
and accident analysis, SSC, and TSR sections of the PSAR. When an ABAR is approved, the
SED, not the PSAR, is updated within 60 days of approval. The SED is the main document that
the Contractor engineering forces refer to when evaluating design and design changes. When the
PSAR is updated biennially, the SED is folded into the PSAR facility-specific volumes verbatim.
For the biennial update to the PSAR, the Contractor updates necessary infonnation collected
over the previous two years and submits to ORP for approval and for updating of the CAA.
Future Challenges
Future challenges that ORP will face that involve the AB are:
• Transitioning from PSAR to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) on a facility-by-
facility basis, not as a project, and
• Regulatory aspect ofmaintaining oversight ofpre-DSA AB evolutions coupled with
DSA-compliant facilities at the same time. This includes establishing the USQ
processes for some facilities.
The DSA for each facility must be approved by ORP and implemented (including associated
readiness activities) prior to "hot commissioning." The current baseline schedule for each
facility is:
• PT Hot Commissioning - Baseline September 2017
• LAW Hot Commissioning - Baseline July 2012
• HLW Hot Commissioning - Baseline December 2017
• BOF Hot Commissioning - Baseline May 2011
• Analytical Laboratory Hot Commissioning - Baseline October 2012
As indicated, the schedules span over a decade ofDSA implementation. ORP and the Contractor
will have both PSAR and DSA process in place at the same time but for different facilities.
The goal is for the Contractor is to submit the DSA to ORP for each facility at least one year
prior to hot commissioning. This allows ORP and the Contractor to integrate the overall
implementation of the DSA, including functional test procedures, surveillance procedures, round
sheets, etc. such that readiness activities can validate full implementation.
Some of the initiatives ORP are working with the Contractor include:
• Electronic PSAR where the hazard and accident analysis, SSC, and derivation ofTSR
are maintained current with respect to ORP authorization, thus eliminating the necessity
of a biennial PSAR update.
• Coordinating both PSAR and DSA oversight simultaneously including a USQ process.
In addition, the operating contractor has not been selected and could be different than
the design and construction contractor. Therefore, it will require significant integration
by both ORP and the contractor (s) as applicable.
• Early identification of specific administrative controls in accordance with DOE-STD-
1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls.
• Current nuclear and process safety requirements regarding classification of SSC
identified in the SRD establishes a more conservative identification of defense-in-depth
(DID) control strategies. Therefore, ORP is pursuing a transition from the existing SSC
classification scheme for DID to the DID definition in DOE-STD-3009, Preparation
Guide for U. S. Department ofEnergy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis
Reports.
These initiatives are in the planning phase and continued negotiation with the Contractor(s) will
be required.
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